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Blog 3
Matthew Steilen, The Place of Norms in Separating Power

Blog Author: Matthew Steilen, Professor of Law, School of Law, University at Buffalo
Introduction: One of the chief intellectual discoveries of the past four years has been the degree to
which government rests on norms: on a shared sense of the proper way to go about the business of

government. This is unsurprising for followers of the law and society movement, with which the Baldy

Center is so closely associated. From the beginning, scholars of law and society have demonstrated the

limits of formalism in explaining how the law actually works. One can think of the Trump presidency as
finally demonstrating for the wider world of legal scholars, the essential role of shared understandings,
legal culture, accepted practice, informal conventions, and customs in our separation of powers. The

judge-made doctrine has changed only at the margins, and its major holdings remain intact, but the real
meaning of separation of powers has been altered dramatically.
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One of the chief intellectual discoveries of the past four years has been the degree to which government
rests on norms: on a shared sense of the proper way to go about the business of government. This is

unsurprising for followers of the law and society movement, with which the Baldy Center is so closely

associated. From the beginning, scholars of law and society have demonstrated the limits of formalism in
explaining how the law actually works. One can think of the Trump presidency as finally demonstrating

for the wider world of legal scholars, the essential role of shared understandings, legal culture, accepted
practice, informal conventions, and customs in our separation of powers. The judge-made doctrine has

changed only at the margins, and its major holdings remain intact, but the real meaning of separation of
powers has been altered dramatically.

When we think of separation of powers, we usually think of judicial doctrines that are designed to keep

each branch within its proper limits, but as the new focus on norms shows, separation of powers is also
about how each branch works on its own. If a branch can’t do what it was formally designed to do

because of a breakdown in norms, then there will be pressure for that function to appear elsewhere in

the constitutional system. One can view the administrative state this way: in the nineteenth century, as
Professor Blackhawk has shown, Congress could not carry out the administrative functions it was
originally assigned through the petition process and through appropriations. [1] There was little

sustained political will to try to make changes to keep those administrative functions in Congress. So, in
1946, the petition process was essentially eliminated and Congress’ administrative functions were
transferred to the executive branch.

It’s worth trying to generalize this account to see what other stories we could tell. One might offer a

similar story about Congress’ foreign policy functions, many of which were transferred to the President
in a series of delegations beginning in the 1930s and 40s concerning trade and the use of armed force.
One could tell such a story about congressional control over and supervision of the government.

Congress’ impeachment function has rarely if ever, worked on the presidency, because the hold of elites
on the office was broken in the early 19th century, and a party system was created to nominate

presidential candidates whose parties divided precisely on the norms that should govern conduct in

office. The impeachment function was replaced, in part, by judicial processes—criminal investigations,
usually—whose scope was hemmed in by a variety of judicial doctrines, principally the doctrines of

executive privilege and executive immunity. In recent years the doctrine of standing has been recruited

to assist in limiting judicial processes to enforce the law against the President or high-ranking executive
officials.

I wonder whether we could say the same thing of the legislative function, that is, of Congress’ power to
make law by passing bills and submitting them to the President for signature. Just like Congress’

administrative functions, just like its foreign policy functions, just like its impeachment and oversight
functions, the legislative function requires norms to work. If those norms are abandoned or prove
unsustainable, then it will be impossible to use the legislative function to solve the problems that

demand a national solution. The unemployment crisis triggered by the Coronavirus might fit here. Are

the norms surrounding the legislative function breaking down? Recently an old article by John Murrin
has been coming to mind, titled, "A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity."

The basis thesis of that article, as I recall, was that there was not, at the time of the founding, a national
political culture sufficient to sustain the operation of a robust national government. The American

government was a roof without the walls of a shared culture to sustain it. What formed in its place was a
veneration of the Constitution and the ongoing project of constitution-making. Today I am tempted to

conclude that whatever shared, national political culture we were able to create has lapsed. Without any
tissue connecting members of Congress, it seems unlikely for them to be able to work with one another

in any of the ways necessary to sustain a successful exercise of the legislative function. A usable national
legislative function is an accomplishment of political culture. Since we lack the culture necessary to
sustain it, we should expect replacements to arise elsewhere in the system.

